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STUDENT NOMS AND COMMENTS
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN KENTUCKY
The right of privacy, as a recognized doctrine, is relatively new in the com-
mon law. The basic concept of the doctrine was set out sixty years ago in a law
review article written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis,' who thought recogm-
tion of the right was needed for the protection of the individual's personality in a
growing society. This right has never received a precise definition, but can be
thought of as a limited right to be let alone.
Warren and Brandeis declared the right of privacy to be an existing common
law principle,' basing their observation on a study of the use of certain legal fic-
tions and analogous cases. The prinary derivative background was the protection
of intellectual and artistic property granted by the common law, wich protected
the right of publication as a property right of the creator.' At the ancient common
law this protection was not extended to items such as personal letters, but in the
growth of the law the property right of the author in a literary manuscript was
extended to the writer of personal letters and the publication of such materials
could be prevented upon the basis of protecting a property right.' Warren and
Brandeis also cited cases protecting what amounted to personal rights upon the
basis of cof an mplied contract, a breach of trust, or a breach of confi-
dence. They believed all these theories were being used to protect what was
basicallv a general right of privacy.
It was realized that such a right could be used in practice only for the cor-
rection and prevention of the more flagrant abuses of the individual's personality'\
and that the norm of the reasonable man would have to be adopted when con-
sidenng vhe,. -r or not there has been an invasion of the right.' Warren and
Brandeis also suggested that certain limitations be incorporated into the general
doctrine. The principle was not to be used to prevent the publication of material
which is of public or general interest, nor should the right be permitted to abridge
the scope of a privileged commumcation under the law of libel and slander. A
tentative caveat was placed upon an invasion by oral publication in the absence
of special damages. The right expires upon publication by or with the consent
of the individual. Truth is not a defense for an invasion of the right of privacy,
nor is the absence of malice in the publisher.-
Both a legal and an equitable remedy were suggested for the enforcement
of the right." The enjoining of an invasion was considered for a limited number
of cases, while an action of tort for damages would lie in all cases. In addition,
the recovery, of substantial compensation could be had without a showing of
special damages.
The doctrine was new and was destined not to be readily accepted by all
jurisdictions. New York, in a leading case,1" rejected the right of privacy, although
a strong dissenting opimon answered the arguments for rejection. This case in the
main set out the usual arguments agmnst acceptance. It was a direct demal of
the existence of the right of privacy at the common law. Lack of precedent was
cited as showing no existence. There was the expression of fear of vastly in-
Warren and Brandeis, The Right To Privacv, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
Id. at 198. 213.11(d. at 198.
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanston 402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
Warren and Brandeis, supra, note I at 207 ff.
,lid. at 216.
7 41 Ast. JUR., Privac,, sec. 12.
"Warren and Brandeis, supra, note 1 at 214-219.
"Id. at 219-220.
'" Roherson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
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creased litigation. Right of privacy was looked upon as a possible restriction of
freedom of speech and press. The injury was shown to be primarily a hurt to the
feelings of the individual. The relief of equitable injunction conflicted with the
historical rule that equity protects only property rights. In summary, the court
looked upon recognition of the doctrine as pure judicial legislation.
Following New York s rejection, a Georgia case was decided which became
the leading one for recognition.'1 The Georgia court recogmzed the doctrine in a
case consisting essentially of the same facts that had resulted in rejection in New
York. Georgia accepted the right of privacy as a common law doctrine, but the
reasons advanced for acceptance were not primarily those of Warren and Brandeis.
The Georgia court placed a constitutional basis under the principle. Freedom of
speech and press were found to have a complement of silence and seclusion. The
natural law was also used as a foundation, privacy being considered as one of the
rights of personal liberty and personal security. Unfortunately however, the earl),
cases of recognition were weak in setting out the derivative background of the
right of privacy.
The clear statement of Warren and Brandeis was the first forthright demand
for recognition of the right of privacy as an independent doctrine. Hindsight
shows, however, that it was not the first thought on privacy. The dissenting
opinion in an early Kentucky case, Gngsby v. Breckenridge, ' 2 showed a realization
of the problem. If the doctrine had been formulated earlier, this case could have
been decided upon an invasion of the right of privacy. Actually, the decision was
based upon the property right in the writer of letters to prevent the publication
of private letters.
In this case, the deceased wife of the plaintiff had saved a great many per-
sonal letters. The defendant, a daughter by a first marriage, clmmed the letters
as a gift from her mother. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the publica-
tion of any of the letters and for the surrender of them. On appeal, the plaintiff
was said to have the right to prevent the publication of the letters he had written,
but the petition as to all else was dismissed. The court recogmzed the exclusive
right of the writer to enjoin the publication of his letters. This right was treated
as a property right. The dissenting opinion felt that the majority of the court had
failed to give force to the right of the plaintiff in its entirety. The dissent argued
on a property right basis, but was making the argument for the protection of the
privacy of the family.
The New York and Georgia cases, involving the commercial use of pictures,
had already been decided when the problem was presented in Kentucky in a very
similar situation in the case of Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn.' This was an action
for damages for using the name and picture of the plmntiff in an advertisement
of the defendant's patent medicine. The Kentucky court chose to accept the doc-
trine while recogmzing that there was a split of authority. There was held to be
an invasion of the right of privacy through the use of the individual's picture,
without his consent, as part of an advertisement to advance the publisher s busi-
ness. While the plaintiff was entitled to recover without proving special damages,
the court did not set out a detailed rationalization for accepting the doctrine.
The next Kentucky decision which considered the right of privacy also in-
volved the unwarranted use of a photograph.' Twin children, joined at the body,
were born to the plaintiffs. When the children died, the defendant was employed
to make a picture of the corpse. Contrary to the agreement, he made copies from
Pavesich v. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1905).
65 Ky. 480 (1867). i
134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W 364 (1909).
"D6uglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S. W 849 (1912).
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the negative and filed for a copyright. Plaintiffs brought an action for damages.
While the court mentioned the possibility of an action for breach of contract or
breach of confidence, the decision was evidently based on the right of privacy,
with the Chinn case cited as authority without being distinguished. The relation
of parent and child could possibly be used to explain the decision under the gen-
eral right, or the act of the defendant in exceeding the authority granted by the
parents could have been the invasion of privacy. A later Kentucky opinion con-
sidered the Stokes case as based solely upon the right of privacy since there is no
property right in a dead body." Contrary to this idea, the right is generally
considered a personal right that ceases on the death of the individual. The Michi-
gan court thought an alleged right of privacy in a similar situation gave no right
of action after death.'
Brents v. Morgan was the first Kentucky decision to give a detailed consid-
eration of the right of privacy. 7 A garage owner had a large sign posted in his
window stating that the plaintiff had not paid his bill. The statement was ad-
mitted to be true, and since truth is a complete defense to libel in Kentucky," this
decision rests squarely upon an invasion of the plaintiff's privacy. The plaintiff
was allowed to recover damages for the humiliation and mental anguish resulting
directly from the posting of the sign. The opinion considered the doctrine as set
out in the Warren-Brandeis article, and evidently adopted the suggested limitations,
at least by dictum.
The principle was extended in this holding to a variant fact situation in winch
there was an attempt to coerce payment. It can be readily seen that the pnn-
ciple was not used as a substitute remedy because of the recognition of a complete
defense to an action of libel. One writer, " citing Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman,
Inc., has suggested that the Brents case could have been decided upon the use of
excessive and unreasonable means to collect a debt. It is doubted that this sug-
gestion is sound for in the Thompson case the the language used on the cards in
an attempt to collect a bill was libelous per se. While there was no denial of
truth in the Thompson case, this complete defense was not raised. Properly, the
Thompson case should have been decided under the right of privacy as used in
the Brents case, since the two fact situations are the same.
Brents v. Morgan sets out a workable doctrine on the right of privacy in Ken-
tucky. Although the principle is not precisely defined, there is a clearer under-
standing of the right of privacy expressed in this case. Later cases in general
have approved the limitations set forth there. Jones v. Herald Post Co.' involved
the limitation on matter of public or general interest. A Louisville newspaper pub-
lished a statement by and a picture of a wife whose husband had been murdered.
She claimed an interference with her right of privacy. The court held that since
the publication of the picture and the allegedly incorrect statement were involved
in a matter of public interest, this limitation on the right must prevail.
The tapping of a telephone wire was held to be an invasion of the right of
privacy in Rhodes v. Graham.' This decision applied the doctrine to still another
variation of facts. The invasion by tapping of a telephone wire was held to be as
"evil" as the unwarranted use of a photograph or publicity in a newspaper.
1- Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 773, 299 S. NV 967, 971 (1927).
"Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W 285 (1899).
17 221 Ky. 765. 299 S. W 967 (1927).
"Ki. CoNEs. Civ. PRAc. sec. 124 (1948).
"Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237, 258 (1932).
181 Ky. .87, 205 S. W 558 (1918).
230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. 2d 972 (1929).
Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. NV 2d 46 (1931).
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Trammell v. Citizens News Co., Inc.' was another invasion involving a news-
paper. The paper published a notice of a debt owed by the plaintiff after being
informed that publication was being made to coerce payment. Although this was
an invasion by a third party rather than the creditor, Brents v. Morgan vas cited
as authority. The primary cause of injury was publication by the newspaper.
The defendant knew a matter of general interest was not involved and the probable
result of the publication. This case could be cited as an example of the lack of
malice being no defense to an invasion of the right of privacy.
The limitation as to oral statements was involved in Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt
Co. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants entered his store and asserted that
the plaintiff possessed cigarettes stolen from the defendants. They searched the
store and took several cartons of cigarettes. Plaintiff brought an action for the
invasion of ns right of privacy, but the court held that there was no cause of
action stated. The right of privacy was shown to protect personal and private
matters that could be distinguished from slander and libel for which there exist
adequate remedies, the doctrine not being intended as a substitute remedy for
this type of violation. If there was an accusation of stealing, the remedy would
properly be an action for slander. Invasions of the right of pnvicy were decided
not to include oral publications. Undoubtedly, the caveat of special damages is
still attached to the limitation of oral statements, since the plaintiff showed none
in this case.
The personal nature of the right of privacy was shown in Tonlin v. Taylor.2-'
Publication in a newspaper of information filed in a confidential tax return of a
bus company involved in a franchise dispute was held not to be an invasion of
the right of privacy of the president of the bus company since the subject was not
personal to him and was involved in a matter of public interest. This holding
was followed in a series of cases.'
In Maysville Transit v. Ort,' a corporation alleged an invasion of its right of
privacy for the use made of its tax reports filed with the State Department of
Revenue. The returns were incorporated into a report made to the city coin-
lmssioners and published in a newspaper. The court by way of dictum stated
the right of privacy was recogmzed for the protection of the feelings of human
beings rather than pecuniary or business interests.
The doctrine as recogmzed in Kentucky offers a reasonably effective remedy
for the protection of the sensibilities of the individual. The course of development
has advanced from a basic recognition of the concept through a delineation of
various limitations attached to the right of privacy. The growth has shaped a
right similar to that recognized by most states giving a common law background
to the doctrine.
The delineation of the right has not resulted in an advantageous use of or a
concerted effort to extend the right by the Kentucky Bar. Such a statement may
be made in view of the limited amount of litigation involving the doctrine. It
may be that the principle is one that results in less titigation than the similar action
of libel, for generally the states have had few privacy case decisions banded down
by appellate courts. Another possibility is that the doctrine, although used in
several different fact situations, has become associated with stereotyped facts,
such as the commercial use of a photograph. Related actions, libel, breach of
285 Ky. 529, 148 S. %V 2d 708 (1941).
2295 Ky. 345, 174 S. AV. 2d 510 (1943).
-290 Ky. 619, 162 S. W 2d 210 (1942).
'Tomlin v. Ort, 296 Ky. 528, 177 S. NV 2d 371 (1943); Maysville Transit Co. v.
Taylor, 296 Ky. 527, 177 S. IN 2d 371 (1943).
296 Ky. 524, 177 S. W 2d 369 (1943).
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confidence, breach of implied contract, have to some extent been used in situations
that could have extended the right of privacy. The superficial resemblance to libel
has also caused some confusion concerning the right. Kentucky has at least in
one case used libel when the privacy doctrine should have been applied.' A late
North Carolina case has a recovery under a privacy count in an action where a
libel count was dismissed.-" It is doubted that this confusion with libel should
exist in Kentucky, since truth is a complete defense to libel but not to the invasion
of privacy. It has been stated that the right of privacy in Kentucky is to be used
to protect matters that can be distinguished from libel and slander. The doctrine
is not intended as a substitute remedy for violations for which there are adequate
remedies. " No matter what explanation is given for the limited litigation, the fact
remins that there have been but few cases on the subject.
There exist at least two excellent possibilities for using the concept of a right
of privacy which have not been the subject of action m Kentucky- (1) the non-
commercial use of name, picture, and personality and (2) radio. Kentucky has
not handed down a positive decision on the first point, but the decisions concern-
ing publications have indicated that. the court is going to give a reasonable lati-
tude to publishers in considering printed material. They also indicate that
Kentucky could find an invasion of privacy in a non-commercial use of name,
picture, or personality:" There are non-commercial publications, not amounting
to libel, which, nevertheless, constitute invasions of privacy. ' It is believed that
this is a situation that can be met by the existing doctrine in Kentucky.
Invasion of privacy by radio is a possible and plausible extension for Ken-
tucky s concept. The law of libel and slander may be involved in this situation.
The question of whether a publication by radio is a libel or slender has not been
determinatively settled,:" and Kentucky has no decisions on the question. The
best solution is to consider such a broadcast as an invasion of privacy rather than
libel or slander, since there is authority for such a view.' However, this solution
may not be adopted. If the broadcast should be classified as libel, the "right of
privacy or libel" problem would be extended to another matter. If it is classified
as slander another question would arise involving the caveat on oral invasion in
Kentucky. There might be a recovery in Kentucky for an oral invasion if special
damages were shown. Normally, special damages are not essential for recovery
in an action for the invasion of the right of privacy. It is recommended that such
an allegation should not be necessary to show a cause of action for a broadcast
invasion of privacy, even if the broadcast is considered oral. The action is to pro-
tect the sensibilities of the individual. The publication by radio is as great if
not greater than that received by most printed material, thus showing that the
basic concept of the oral statement limitation is invalid in this particular type of
case. Such invasions require control through the right of privacy action without
complete denial through a limitation refusing redress for an oral invasion or an
extreme hindrance by a requirement to show special damages.
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- Thompson v. Adelberg & Berman, Inc., supra, note 20.
"'Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).
-Gregory, v. Bryant-Hunt Co., supra, note 24 at 349, 174 S.W 2d at 512.
"I Trammell v. Citizens News Co., Inc., supra, note 23 at 532, 148 S.W 2d at 709;
Jones v. Herald Post Co., supra, note 21 at 229, 18 S.W 2d at 973.
Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 Pac. 2d 133 (1947); Barber
v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.V 2d 291 (1942).
"" PROSSEiR. TORTS, sec. 92, p. 796 (1941).
"Mau %. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939); Waring v.
VI)AS Broadcasting Station, 327 Pa. 433, 456, 194 At. 631, 642 (1937) (concurring
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